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There has been evidence for the very brief, temporal quantization of perceptual
experience at regular intervals below 100ms for several decades. We briefly describe
how earlier studies led to the concept of “psychological moment” of between 50 and
60ms duration. According to historical theories, within the psychological moment all
events would be processed as co-temporal. More recently, a link with physiological
mechanisms has been proposed, according to which the 50–60ms psychological
moment would be defined by the upper limit required by neural mechanisms to
synchronize and thereby represent a snapshot of current perceptual event structure.
However, our own experimental developments also identify a more fine-scaled, serialized
process structure within the psychological moment. Our data suggests that not all events
are processed as co-temporal within the psychological moment and instead, some
are processed successively. This evidence questions the analog relationship between
synchronized process and simultaneous experience and opens debate on the ontology
and function of “moments” in psychological experience.
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WHAT HAPPENS IN A MOMENT
On an experiential level, a perceptual moment is usually defined as what one experiences in the
immediate and “specious present,” i.e., a time interval spanning several hundreds of milliseconds
(ms) to a second (see Anderson and Grush, 2009, for definition). For example, when listening
to a melody, it would correspond to what is presently in mind, including the note played just
before and possibly the note expected to immediately follow. Events are thus clearly distinguished
in time within the experienced present. However, a shorter interval has been recorded related
to the discretization of psychological events. In this paper we will describe the evidence for this
shorter interval. We first describe how earlier work led to the idea that events are processed as
co-temporal within elementary time windows of 50–60ms. We then review our data and the
literature that challenges this view by showing that events are automatically distinguished in time
at shorter asynchronies. This will allow us to discuss the structure that brings about an elementary
quantization of perceptual events.
Although not the first to postulate its existence, Brecher was amongst the first to empirically
define a psychological moment below 100ms. In an ingenious set of experiments, Brecher (1932)
established the minimal time required for the perceptual separability of two or more events
presented repeatedly and in sequence. Importantly, Brecher’s estimate was near identical across
modalities in healthy adult participants at 55.3ms for tactile stimulation and 56.9ms for visual
stimulation, with standard deviations of no greater than 1.4ms across 14 subjects. Also important
was the close corroboration of Brecher’s empirical estimate with earlier, although difficult to verify,
estimates given by Lalanne (1876) and von Baer. von Baer (1864) is believed to have proposed to
the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg a fundamental quantum of experienced time at
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1/18th of a second, deviations from which could allow for the
accurate prediction of the life span of the organism. While
influential in the development of ideas such as that of “Umwelt”
(phenomenal surrounding) proposed by von Uexküll (1957), no
reference is made to this topic in proceedings of the St. Petersburg
meeting (e.g., Von Baer, 1909).
A more contemporary conceptualization is related to the
idea that during this 53–55ms interval, neural mechanisms
are engaged that render two stimuli as the parts of a single
event structure. In this context, the interval described here
may refer to a minimum number of oscillations (and so
maximum interval) required for two or more neurons to
form an assembly that allows for the coding of perceptual
structure. This idea refers to a theory expressed in the context
of literature on oscillatory neural binding (i.e., the neural code
believed to be responsible for the neural coding of relations
in perceptual structure, see Singer, 1993, 1999). This theory
postulates a minimum number of oscillatory cycles between
synchronized neurons is required for a synchronized assembly
to be statistically separable from a spurious synchronization—
and thus treated by the perceptual system as likely to be coding
multi-dimensional perceptual structure. Given oscillations in
the broad band 30–70Hz have been shown to be associated
with coding perceptual structure, this would entail between 2
and 3 synchronized events are sufficient to signal perceptual
structure within a 53–55ms interval. It must be acknowledged
that this estimate should be treated as speculative, though, since
estimates of binding oscillations are taken from a variety of
species, which may be subject to different perceptual moments
as compared to human beings (see Brecher, 1932, for examples).
There are, however a number of estimates of simultaneity
thresholds and before treating Brecher’s moment in greater
detail these, and some other moments require consideration:
minimum simultaneity thresholds have been estimated from
reports of the simultaneity of spatially separate flashes or lines
presented in close spatial proximity. Stimuli such as these may
be perceived as simultaneous for inter-flash intervals within
the range 1–5ms; only at larger intervals do they yield the
perception of successiveness (in this case of apparent motion,
see Sweet, 1953; Westheimer and McKee, 1977; Wehrhahn and
Rapf, 1992). Other estimates suggest maximum intervals for
the perception of simultaneity and by extension minimum time
differences in temporal order discrimination (with attendant
motion perception) for intervals of between 17 and 44ms (Exner,
1875). Empirical evidence has accumulated over the last decades
showing that temporal order thresholds across modalities reliably
lie in the time range between 20 and 60ms (Pöppel, 1997; Fink
et al., 2006; Babkoff and Fostick, 2013), and with some variation
as a function of stimulus properties (Wittmann, 2011).
Unlike paradigms relying upon simultaneity judgments to two
events presented simultaneously, or with a small asynchrony,
Brecher presented his stimuli as a series of paired events
and in this series of events, each event consisted of two
simultaneous or slightly asynchronous stimuli. This design,
while lending greater ecological validity to his estimate leads
to the requirement to process temporal relationships—not only
between the two stimuli in each event, but also across events
within the series. Simultaneity is estimable only if there is
a third (or subsequent) event with which events within the
simultaneity are perceptually separable (discussed in detail in
Elliott et al., 2007). The point here is that “moments” are not
only defined by stimuli bound into a simultaneity, but also
by the segregation of the simultaneity from other events in
past (and future) moments. This leads to a time paradox, i.e.,
our difficulty to understand how our perception can be both
discontinuous, with separable events, and continuous, with a
feeling that time flows without interruption with all events related
in time. Considering our experience is rarely of events in staccato,
the moments that are measured experimentally may not be a
description of phenomenal experience itself but of an underlying
discretization such as that implied by Brecher and proposed by
Stroud (1955), who postulated the existence of 110ms quanta
underlying phenomenal experience. This was a reinterpretation
of Allport’s (1964) study of perceived simultaneity in terms of
the moment as a continuous, running sample of the input (a
Traveling Moment Hypothesis) and thus reconciles the ideas
of continuity and discontinuity. This is an important idea in
the present context as it allows us to be clear that we are
not discussing—directly—our experience of duration (aka time
perception) or simultaneity or asynchrony. Instead, and as will
become clear, we are discussing what we can learn of the
discretization of event structure, implicitly (and very likely at a
neural level although there exists very little direct data to support
this), and how this relates to the experience of events in an
uninterrupted, temporal continuity.
At the ceiling of estimates concerned with immediate
perceptual experience are perhaps those of Efron (1970a,b),
who describes the minimum duration of an experience as
of 137ms. However and because of its dependence on the
organization of event structure, Brecher’s moment may be an
estimate of an upper limit on elementary perceptual integration.
This seems plausible by analogy to spatial organization. In this
case, binding between separate features is generally held to
result from neuronal assemblies formed by the synchronization
of contributive neurons via phase alignment of their spiking
in bursts of frequency oscillations (reviewed in Singer, 1999).
In addition, Duncan and Humphreys (1989) showed that the
very early spatial coding guiding activities such as visual search
requires the preattentive segregation of target features from
distractors, implying that early grouping is partly derived from
relational coding across the entire visual scene.
Using a paradigm similar to that employed by Brecher,
in that the paradigm employed repeating visual presentations,
Elliott et al. (2007) found mean simultaneity thresholds to
target pairings in very close proximity to those reported by
Brecher (61ms). One modification employed by Elliott et al.
(2007) was the masked presentation of an asynchrony just
prior to target presentation. This allowed investigation of
whether a subthreshold synchrony (SBS) or asynchronies (SBA)
would bring about a shift in the threshold for perceived
simultaneity, and at which asynchronies, if any, this shift
would be found. As illustrated in Figure 1, two stimuli were
first presented synchronously (SBS) or asynchronously (SBA).
The asynchrony was made non-detectable by embedding the
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the paradigm used to check for the effect of subthreshold asynchrony. The curves represent the increase in luminance of the two
target bars, A and B. The first increase in luminance is used as a prime and masked by the distracters (“priming” figure). The prime is asynchronous when the two bars
increase their luminance asynchronously. The task of the participant is to decide whether the second increase in luminance is simultaneous or asynchronous
(reproduced with the permission of Schizophrenia Bulletin).
stimuli within distracters. These stimuli served as primes and,
after the disappearance of distracters, they were increased in
luminance, following which, participants had to decide whether
this luminance increase was simultaneous or asynchronous.
Interestingly, SBS and SBA produce different patterns of effects
only for targets over a very short range of stimulus-onset
asynchronies (SOAs) between targets (including physically
simultaneous targets). For target SOAs of up to 21ms, there
appeared to be a small bias towards simultaneity judgments
following exposure to SBS, relative to simultaneity judgments
following exposure to SBA. In addition, and for presentations
above threshold (61ms) there seems to be a decreasing tendency
to report simultaneity when the targets were preceded by
SBS. That enhanced simultaneity reportage (following SBS)
is maintained for SOAs of 0–(14–21) ms is interesting in
that the interval 14–21ms is very close to the maximum
separation in time between the firing of different neurons within
synchronized neural assemblies in visual cortex (see, e.g., Gray
et al., 1989, for data; and Singer, 1993, for review). The rhythmic
synchronization of neuronal firing is believed to facilitate the
formation of functional neuronal assemblies with those operating
in the EEG gamma band (30–70Hz) associated with functions
that includes perceptual processing. What is suggested by the
findings of Elliott et al. (2007) is that subthreshold stimulus
asynchronies at very short SOAs may influence the efficiency
of neuronal synchronization from which we can conclude that
functional neuronal assemblies form within the moment with the
goal of representing coherent perceptual structure.
The functional moment appears to be constrained by the
temporal properties of neurons, i.e., the time needed to
synchronize neuron assemblies. In turn, it constrains perception
by providing a temporal organization. Since moments are too
short to yield a perception of duration (Wittmann, 2011), they
are thought to be elementary elements in the composition
of trains of thoughts. However, they may not correspond to
elementary information: on the contrary and as implied above,
they may form as a consequence of information integration.
In case of multisensory information, up to 100–200ms may be
needed to distinguish an asynchrony between visual and auditory
information (Vatakis and Spence, 2007; van Wassenhove, 2009).
Does this mean that perception is a series of snapshots from
which we rebuild an experiential continuity a posteriori (Neisser,
1967; Ullman, 1979; Shimojo, 2014; van Rullen et al., 2014)? This
possibility requires us to understand both how visual information
is correctly organized if it is initially integrated within elementary
windows (Gepshtein and Kubovy, 2000), as well as how
the coding of discrete moments can be reconciled with our
experience of events as in continuous time. Several solutions have
been proposed; for instance the overlap of moments (Dainton,
2010). However, there are many different conceptualizations
(Phillips, 2014), and recent results may suggest alternative
possibilities, which are discussed in the following.
Scharnowski et al. (2009) and Pilz et al. (2013) have found
that stimuli perceived as fused in time (i.e., co-temporal) may
in fact be initially processed as temporally segregated. In these
studies, the authors used stimuli presented in sequence over
short time intervals that lead to a temporally fused percept. They
applied either TMS (Scharnowski et al., 2009) or masking (Pilz
et al., 2013) at different delays to disturb information processing,
and examined which of the two successive stimuli dominated
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the perception. This procedure allowed them to establish that
the processing of the two successive stimuli can be disturbed
distinctly and in turn. Their results show that disturbance
applied 45–90ms after stimuli onset affects the processing of
the first stimulus (leading to the dominance of the second
stimulus), whereas disturbance applied 95–420ms after stimuli
onset affects the processing of the second stimulus (leading to the
dominance of the first stimulus). It is only after delays of 400–
500ms that both stimuli are perceived as temporally fused with
neither TMS nor masking modifying the fusion. These results
show that information integration is slow and that perception
is more discrete than believed from subjective reports. In
addition, the results suggest a specific time course for information
processing: for between 400 to 500ms, successive stimuli are as
yet not integrated, and instead processed one after the other, in
sequence.
Such a possibility was explored in another series of studies,
initially aimed at exploring the time course of perception in
schizophrenia. These studies were motivated by the fact that
patients with schizophrenia have been described as suffering
from a fragmentation of consciousness, with a loss of the
sense of time continuity (Fuchs, 2007). Several studies have
shown a lengthening of the perceptual moment: i.e., patients
required larger asynchronies than controls to detect asynchronies
(Foucher et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2009; Schmidt et al.,
2011; Lalanne et al., 2012a; Martin et al., 2013). This effect
was independent of decisional or another non-specific factor
(reviewed in Giersch et al., 2013). The lengthening of the
perceptual moment became quite large in presence of distracters
(Giersch et al., 2009) or in case of multisensory signals (Martin
et al., 2013). The integration of information within temporal
windows of several 100ms in patients questioned the way these
subjects interact with the environment, especially as it contrasted
with their mild pathological state. The implicit processing of
stimuli over time was investigated, i.e., the ability to detect
asynchronies independent of a conscious judgment. The Simon
effect (Simon, 1969) was used to that aim, which corresponds
to the tendency to press on the side of a stimulus independent
of the task at hand. For example, if the task is to discriminate
between squares and circles, and to press respectively on the left
and right side in case of a square vs. a circle, subjects will tend to
press on the left whenever the stimulus is displayed on the left,
even if it is a circle. The mechanisms of this effect are reviewed
in Hommel (2011a,b) and van der Lubbe and Abrahamse (2011),
and it was used as a tool to examine the automatic processing
of stimuli over time. This first required some adaptation of the
Simon effect, since two stimuli and not only one, are presented
during temporal tasks. As a matter of fact, when two stimuli are
simultaneously displayed on the screen, one on the right side and
the other on the left side of the screen, responses cannot be biased
on either side, since information is perfectly symmetrical. A bias
can be observed only in case of an asymmetry between right and
left sides, which occurs in case of an asynchrony between the two
stimuli. In case of a clear asynchrony, we have shown that subjects
are biased to press on the response key located on the side of the
second stimulus, whether it is on the left or on the right (Lalanne
et al., 2012a,b; illustrated in Figure 2).
This shows that the Simon effect can be used with
a simultaneity/asynchrony discrimination task. The critical
analysis, however, regarded the exploration of the Simon effect
in case of undetected asynchronies, for SOAs below 20ms.
Inasmuch as such asynchronies yield the same amount of
“simultaneous” responses as perfect synchrony, they may have
been expected to inhibit presentation of a Simon effect. If
stimuli are processed as co-temporal, they would indeed yield
symmetrical information on both sides on the screen, thus
precluding any response bias to either side. This is not what
was observed, however. In healthy subjects and for asynchronies
as short as 17ms, a bias to the side of the second stimulus
was still observed. Importantly, in patients a bias was also
observed to the side of the first stimulus (Lalanne et al., 2012a,b),
and this was observed even for asynchronies as short as 8ms
(Giersch et al., 2015). Apart from the significance regarding
schizophrenia pathophysiology (Martin et al., 2014), this result
is important because it suggests a dissociation between the
automatic processing of stimuli over time at delays below
20ms, and the explicit ability to distinguish events in time.
First, patients’ ability to detect asynchronies is disturbed, and
there is thus a large gap between their ability to explicitly
discriminate visual stimuli in time (threshold around 50ms) and
their implicit processing over time (8ms). Second, the Simon
effect is reversed at short (on the side of the first stimulus) and
at large asynchronies (on the side of the second stimulus). The
implicit ability to discriminate stimuli in time may play a special
role in the processing of visual information, by providing the
means to follow stimuli over time at an implicit level and with a
high temporal accuracy. The possibility that stimuli are processed
successively at an unconscious level is suggested by the studies of
Scharnowski et al. (2009) and Pilz et al. (2013). Elliott et al. (2007)
also suggested that the processing of short asynchronies can be
modulated by prior temporal information, i.e., pairs of events
whose simultaneity or asynchrony was made non-detectable by
the presence of distracters. Asynchronies used to study the time
course of information processing (Scharnowski et al., 2009; Pilz
et al., 2013) were generally set at around 40ms, similar to the
asynchronies used for primers in Elliott et al. (2007). What
the Simon effect at 17ms brings in addition is evidence that
information delayed by asynchronies below 30ms is not treated
as co-temporal by all processes. Specifically, processing, even
at small delays is dependent upon stimulus order, suggesting
a serialization of processing, even within very short processing
windows. This idea is supported by a recent study using healthy
volunteers carried out by Poncelet and Giersch (2015). These
authors used a priming paradigm to investigate the impact of two
(unmasked) primes delayed by 17ms on the subsequent detection
of a target, or on the ordering of two targets (Figure 3).
The aim of this experiment was to check if the primes
facilitated or inhibited the detection of a target displayed in the
location of the first or second prime1. Facilitation would suggest
that attentional mechanisms has deployed to the prime location,
1Here the paradigm did not consist in the exploration of the influence of
simultaneity/asynchrony on a temporal judgment. The paradigm was built to
examine how the successive primers were processed in time.
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the paradigm used to measure a Simon effect when stimuli are asynchronous. The asynchrony is manipulated from 0 to 100ms
by 8 or 17ms steps. The subjects decide whether the stimuli are simultaneous or asynchronous and press a response key accordingly. The Simon effect shows in a
tendency to press on either the first or second stimulus side, whatever the side of this stimulus, as shown on the figure.
while inhibition would indicate that attention had shifted from
the prime location. This procedure thus allowed examination
of how attention shifts as a function of prime presentation.
The time course of facilitation and/or inhibition was studied by
examining how either evolved over a range of delays between
primes and targets. Importantly, asynchronies below 20ms were
non-detectable, and these asynchronies should have led stimuli
to be integrated within the same temporal window. Yet, the
results confirmed that stimuli presented with asynchronies of
17ms were processed as temporally separate events. The results
also suggested that successive primes were processed serially,
consistent with an attentional account. This was indicated by
inhibition on the side of the first prime after a short delay (50ms
between primes and target) and by the facilitation on the side
of the second prime (100ms after the occurrence of primes).
Importantly, we checked that these effects did not depend on
the side of the hand response by changing the response mode
(answering on the side of the first vs. second target). Effects
are rather a consequence of a shift of attention (see Poncelet
and Giersch, 2015, for a more detailed discussion on alternative
explanations).
Several studies have now established that visual stimuli are
distinguished in time at an implicit level even when belonging
to the same perceptual moment. Moreover, it seems healthy
observers can unconsciously follow events of the same temporal
moment over time, possibly by displacing their attention from
one event to the other (Poncelet and Giersch, 2015). All in all
these results suggest that information processing is temporally
structured even within perceptual moments. It might seem
surprising that these effects stayed unnoticed, but this might have
been so because most paradigms involve integration processes.
For example the flash-lag effect relies on the display of a moving
object and a flashing light at some point of the trajectory.
Typically, the moving object is perceived ahead of its real location
at the time of the flashing light. The shift can correspond to a
delay as long as a perceptual moment (25–45ms; Whitney and
Murakami, 1998; Kanai et al., 2004). The implicit processing
of information in time should lead to higher precision, but
seems not to prevent illusions to occur. This means it is the
perceptual moment that shapes conscious experience, even in
tasks that do not require an explicit temporal judgment. As a
consequence the conscious experience may mask the influence
of unconscious mechanisms operating over short delays, i.e.,
within the perceptual moment. It does not mean, however, that
such unconscious mechanisms have no impact on our conscious
experience. It only means that this influence is obscured by the
operation of other processes, such as postdiction mechanisms
(Shimojo, 2014). These help to interpret and render information
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FIGURE 3 | Illustration of one of the priming paradigms used to test how a 17ms asynchrony is processed. Empty frames were used as primes, and were
either simultaneous or asynchronous, with a 17ms asynchrony. After a delay of 100ms, one of the frame was filled in, representing the target, and subjects had to
press on its side. The results showed that RTs were faster when the target was to the side of the 2d rather than the first frame.
in the environment as meaningful. In the real world our sensory
systems are continuously subjected to multiple, unrelated signals.
Under these circumstances, automatically integrating successive
events within temporal windows would not help to make
sense of this information, while an additional processing step
might prove helpful. The availability of individual events before
their integration within a perceptual moment, together with a
progressive displacement of attention following the events, may
be used to apply filters and choose to which extent events will
be included within the perceptual moment. This might explain
the length of the integration process as described in Scharnowski
et al. (2009) and Pilz et al. (2013). Such an hypothesis is
speculative and requires confirmation. However, what is clear
is that the processing of perceptual information is refreshed at
high frequency and that the integration and fusion of information
does not preclude access to individual and successive information
within perceptual moments.
The high frequency of the information processing refreshment
rate converges with the results of Elliott et al. (2007), who has
shown that sub-threshold synchrony up to 14–21ms primes the
detection of simultaneous targets. This interval, as suggested
above, may correspond to the time required to establish neuronal
assemblies of synchronized neurons, and thus to integrate
information. This kind of integration, however, would mainly
correspond to the binding of single events in time: in this case the
presentation of two synchronous or quasi-synchronous stimuli.
With reference to the binding of discrete neural processes in
ever-changing event structures, we might expand definition of
“event structure” to include all events, including the neural
events to which the responses of any two functionally separable
processes would have to respond. So for example, different
neural assemblies are responsible for coding the color and the
direction of motion of an object, and their binding ensures the
moving item maintains object constancy (i.e., it is perceived as
the same object and the same color) in spite of the movement
of the object and its spatial displacement, as well as factors
such as the observers eye movements (which might include
micro-tremor and fast, stimulus-independent oscillations, e.g.,
Neuenschwander and Singer, 1996). On this basis, relatively fast
binding, operating at elementary levels of perceptual processing
might be necessary to ensure correct bindings are coded and
maintained in spite of unpredictable changes in the event
structure to which the synchronized assembly responds. It is
only when events are more distant in time, i.e., above 14–21ms,
that assemblies for each event would be distinguished from one
another. Such assemblies would be local, and would allow for
successive processing of events. However, extracting information
on asynchrony and order may require additional processing
entailing a comparison of the two events. It is this comparison
that would then be accessed consciously, possibly based on
longer-range synchronization phenomena. This might be one
explanation for the fact that events that are 17ms apart can
be automatically and unconsciously followed in time, based on
successive local synchronization phenomena, but that conscious
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separation of events in time occurs at larger asynchronies only.
This possibility is also consistent with the observations that some
time is needed to relate successive events with one another, and
to integrate them into conscious forms (Scharnowski et al., 2009;
Pilz et al., 2013) and across perceptual moments.
The fact that information is automatically distinguished in
time within intervals as short as 17ms is not necessarily in
contradiction with the concepts of temporal windows, inasmuch
it mainly adds an additional, implicit level of processing. What
requires consideration is how evidence for implicit processing
changes our understanding of the emergence of the sense of
time continuity. The fact that we are able to process and follow
information over time with high temporal fidelity seems to
contribute to our feeling of time continuity. Indeed, the fact
that we can process information with a better time accuracy
at an unconscious than at a conscious level means that any
environmental change between successive 50ms windows can
be resolved by means of a smoothing over processes responsible
for event coding. In addition, each time we consciously look,
potentially we unconsciously check for new information several
times. In this sense, it can be approximated that we have a
continuous access to the outer world.
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